Introduction

15
One of the best known models of auction theory involves an informed bidder competing for 16 a common value object against one or more uninformed bidders. There are at least three reasons 17 why this model became so well known. First, it applies to a wide variety of situations of interest. This type of auction was described by Woods (1965) bounded support and u is drawn independently from an atomless distribution. Players 2, . . . , N 36 make no observations. The value of the object for all players is h, and the object is sold using a 37 first price auction. Although this is not explicit in EMW, the strategy space S i for the uninformed 38 player i is the space of distributions in R + :
denote a strategy for the informed player. As EMW (correctly) argue, this is the unique equilibrium 43 bidding strategy of player 1. 1 Furthermore, this uniqueness is established without assuming that 44 player 2's equilibrium strategy is unique.
45
EMW goes on to claim that, for EMW's proof of the claim proceeds by asserting that since β is optimal, β(h, u) solves
with first order necessary condition 
Then, the probability that the uninformed bidder bids less than b is the probability that β(h) is 64 less than b:
which is not differentiable:
In the next section, I present an alternate proof of uniqueness. 
A proof of uniqueness
70
If F is degenerate, the problem is trivial, so assume F is non-degenerate. Suppose 
Because F is non degenerate and h = > h, h = > b, which together with the last equation yield
96
Let H denote the convex hull of the support of F, and let b: H → R be any selection from
That is, 
(h − b(h))K(b(h)) = (h − b(h))[G(b(h)) − J(b(h))]
= (h − b(h))K(b(h)) + h h K(b(s)) ds(4)
105
The following inequalities constitute a contradiction, proving that G = J: 
